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ABSTRACT
A consistent trade methodology can be created o
characterize operations model alternatives for crewed
exploration missions. For example, a trade-space with
the objective of maximizing Crew Exploration Vehicle
independence would have as an 'input' the category of
analysis/decision to be made, and when the
analysis/decision is required. For example, does the
decision relate to crew activity planning or life
support, and will it be made during trans-Earth
injection, cruise, or lunar descent? Different kinds of
decision analysis of the trade -space between human
and automated decisions will occur at different points
in a mission's profile. The necessary objectives at a
given point in time during a mission will call for
different kinds of response with respect to where and
how 'automation' is expected to help provide an
accurate, safe, and timely response. In this paper, a
consistent methodology for assessing the trades
between human and automated decisions on-board will
be presented and various examples discussed.
INTRODUCTION
As we begin to use the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV) first for missions to the International
Space Station (ISS), and then to other low-earth orbit
missions, we expect that despite Orion being a new
spacecraft with significant potential for automation, it
will be operated with a strong ground-based mission
control. When the Orion is going to a lunar sortie or
longer-term lunar mission, it will also have a strong
real-time mission control support the crew. Due to
communication time-delays, this will change when an
Orion begins to enter interplanetary space, such as on a
mission to a near-earth object (NEO). How would the
location of the exploration mission drive the level of
on-board mission automation, and how does that locus
of authority impact how a mission is operated on-
board and with earth-based support?.
This paper assesses these issues and proposes a
consistent trade methodology to characterize and
assess operations models for crewed exploration
missions. In addition, the split between what decisions
and operations a flight controller or a crew-member
would perform versus the options to automate them is
critical for mission success. The robustness of the
mission and many of the associated costs are greatly
impacted by on-board system capabilities and how
well they are developed.
There is a spectrum of ways to perform crewed space
exploration missions operations. At one end, the
current NASA model assumes
 a strong, nearly always
present mission control staff, with exceptionally
detailed insight into moment-by-moment crew
operations and all spacecraft systems and subsystems.
The other end of this spectrum has been popularized
by many science fictions television shows such as Star
Trek, where the spacecraft and crew are completely
autonomous from any control, insight or guidance
from the Earth. In this paper, these modes are referred
to as earth-based and on -board operations,
respectively.
The “locus of authority” axis in Figure 1 illustrates a
continuum of the interaction between human activity
and automation. Humans can make decisions with
automated support, e.g. calculating ramifications of
human decisions, or the system can run in “fire and
forget” mode, where humans provide goals or
reference point for vast tracts of the expected operable
space, and are only asked for input and guidance in
special or extreme circumstances.
The “locus of control” axis shows the location of the
decision or analysis process: Earth-based or On-board.
On-board locus of control for is fundamental shift in
crewed spacecraft.
To date, all NASA crewed missions been designed
with the expectation and desire of comprehensive,
earth-based mission operations capable of providing
extensive knowledge and insight to the crew
throughout the mission and in any circumstance. The
most notable example of this was the Apollo 13
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incident, when mission ops and engineering teams’	 return to earth.
ingenuity saved the crew’s lives and enabled a safe
Figure 1: Four corners of outcome for Human Automation trades.
Note: The axes represent a continuum and are not binary-valued, this depiction provide a framework for
considering trade-offs between automation and manual decisions/analyses.
To explore how mission profiles impact mission
operations decisions, we can create trade-trees that
portray ops model alternatives. Figure 2 shows what
happens if our objective is to maximize the CEV crew
independence. The ‘input’ to this trade -tree is the type
of analysis/decision to be made, and it timing during
the mission profile.
For example, does the decision have to do with crew
activity planning, or life support? What is the mission
phase? What information would go into the decision
or analysis? Different kinds of decisions and analysis
at different points in a mission’s profile call for
different answers on how automation could help
provide an accurate, safe, and timely response.
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Figure 2: Trade-tree for maximizing CEV independence from Earth control.
Note: Green circles represent trade-tree exit points that should be studied with high priority, and yellow
circles are medium priority.
Maximizing CEV independence (shown in Figure 2)
would lead to an on-board operations capability that
can effectively achieve mission objectives under a
wide variety of circumstances. However, it could also
be expensive to develop and introduce significant
complexity to on-board computer system relative to
present standards.
Figure 3 shows another trade-tree, this time with the
objective of using Earth-based support to the greatest
possible extent. The input to this trade-tree is the same
as shown in Figure 2, but the results are quite different.
This time, whenever it’s possible to leave a decision or
analysis on Earth, that is what is chosen. This
approach will likely yield an operations infrastructure
that is more similar to the current Shuttle and ISS
systems, and thus be quicker to construct, but the CEV
will probably be less time-efficient, and it’s
dependence on support from Earth will reduce the
variety of viable missions.
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Figure 3: Trade-tree for maximizing Earth-based support.
Note: Green and yellow circles represent trade-tree exit points that should be studied with high and medium
priority.
After reviewing the above two trade-trees, it becomes
clear that Figure 1 provided a summary of all of the
‘exits’ in both trade-trees, and indeed, a summary of
exits from all possible trade-trees. While many other
trade-trees are possible, based on alternative
objectives, all will eventually produce guidance
regarding where a decision or analysis should be made
(locus of control), and how humans, both flight
controllers and crew, and automation participate
together in making that decision (locus of authority).
The trade-tree outcomes in Figure 1 characterize all
the options for localizing the making of decisions, and
different trade-trees weight and prioritize these
outcomes in different ways. For the discussion in this
paper, we will consider the trade-trees for a crewed
mission to a near -earth asteroid using the Orion CEV.
This analysis will expose the types of decisions needed
for earth-based operations and those necessary for on-
board operations by the crew and support automation.
CONSTELLATION PROGRAM ’ S MISSION OPERATIONS
NASA Johnson Space Center’s (JSC) Mission
Operations Directorate (MOD) manages and maintains
the flight operations of all of NASA’s human space
missions. Manned flight operations support is
provided by the combination of several ground mission
control centers around the U.S. and the World,
primarily focused through the Mission Control Center
(MCC-H) at JSC in Houston, Texas. With the
retirement of the Shuttle in the early 2010’s, MOD at
JSC is in the initial stages of planning the Operations
support activities associated with the new Orion for
both the initial ISS visits and Lunar flights. MOD has
stated a goal of manning the Orion’s flight support
with approximately 50% of the manning currently
required for Shuttle. This goal is based in part on the
assumed simplicity of operations of Orion as compared
to the Shuttle and on assumed increased automation
within the spacecraft onboard systems. MOD is
restructuring itself to be more efficient in support of
the “Plan, Train, and Fly” activities associated with the
Constellation Program (CxP), and are also
investigating several technology infusion opportunities
from across NASA to provide increased automation to
the earth-based controllers. For example, the CxP
Mission Operation Project Office is working with
NASA Ames to create new intelligent systems for
mission operations. 1
 This paper utilizes the status of
on-going 2009 work to premise future impacts on the
space operations community. 2
The flight phase of any mission includes the real-time
flight operations with the Flight Director, Flight
Controllers, Ground Controllers (for the facilities), the
Engineering support, and in the case of ISS, the
International Partner operations support and
integration. Within the MCC-H, the team is structured
such that the Flight Control Room (FCR) is the focus
of all mission control, with the Flight Director,
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CAPCOM (originally a contraction for Capsule
Communications, but relevant to ISS also), the vehicle
systems flight control specialists, and other specialists
integrally involved in making the mission decisions.
For most of the positions within the MCC-H FCR,
there are support flight controllers in the Multi-
Purpose Support Rooms (MPSR) within the MCC-H
and in some cases in remote locations (such as the
Canadian ISS Robotics Support). The detailed
engineering support is provided by the Mission
Evaluation Room, and this team can get support as
needed from the systems experts at other centers,
industry, and International Partners. MOD is assessing
several new Ames -developed technologies and tools to
enhance the real-time mission support environment
including better search tools for flight-related
information, a more interactive display building
environment, and telemetry monitoring and agent-
based support tools to off-load the work of the flight
controllers. For all these technology improvements to
the mission support (“Plan, Train, Fly), MOD is using
the current ISS support environment as a test-bed.
Traditionally, past crewed NASA missions have been
highly dependent upon earth-based missio n perations.
Crewed missions hardware and software systems are
programmed to be capable of dealing with many
unanticipated events, but most of the flexibility of the
crewed missions comes from the crew itself and the
ability of the earth
 -based flight controllers to adapt and
handle any situation. This means that the primary
responsibility for handling unforeseen situations
always resides with humans, who are either onboard
the spacecraft or in mission control.
MISSION OPERATIONS FLIGHT OPERATIONS
IMPROVEMENT TEAM
In 2006, MOD chartered the Flight Operations
Improvement Team (FOIT) to evaluate the processes,
structures, and technical approaches that mission
operations would need to support the Vision for Space
Exploration, and the new Constellation Program.
The approach suggested by the FOIT automation team
was to aim for full autonomy of future exploration
missions from the earth. This means that the
spacecraft and crew operate without intervention from
the ground. This capability is clearly required for the
future Mars missions, and the Lunar missions will
provide a transition to this kind of operations. This
autonomy may be achieved by a combination of
automated and manual functions on-board, but requires
no cues from the ground. The current MOD plan to
support future operations, by necessity, is to evolve
their existing operations systems, processes and
capabilities to support this future Orion and
exploration autonomy concept. This means MOD
wants to incorporate automation capability within
ground operational practices at the beginning of the
first flight of the Orion to the maximum extent
possible. Preparing for this improved operations
automation must be a staged process where it is
necessary to assess what are the components of the
future operations that are desired to be either on-board
or earth-based3 . Then knowing conceptually what are
the future operational models to be striven for, to
incorporate augmented automation capability within
operational practices of the Mission Operations
Directorate.
The FOIT study recommended several conceptual
constraints upon future spacecraft, such as “Design a
vehicle that can be automated safely.” However the
most significant recommendations were focused upon
the overall operations strategy. This applies equally to
the existing ground-based operational infrastructure
used by MOD and the future goal of operations. These
are (in part);
(1) Utilize automation where it makes sense... and
define up front what makes sense.
(2) Let flight experience dictate what functions
should be automated. Focus automation
capability where requirements and vehicle
functionality are clear and well understood.
Phase in automation of complex operations as
those operations mature.
(3) Define roles & responsibilities up front. Clarify
expectations and requirements for all phases of
related development, delivery, and utilization.
More specifically, clarify the transition points for
authority and responsibility between all
organizations involved in automation
development and implementation.
(4) Address interactions with other areas of MOD
responsibility: MCC, recon, training, procedure
development, ops planning.
(5) Allocate responsibility for developing automation
products that are not embedded in flight software
to Mission Operations.
For example, to evolve from the existing practices
operating the ISS required the assessment of what gaps
exist in progressively making ISS more automated.
This would initially not require more autonomy from
the ground, but would mean that the current ISS
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operations would be targeted for increase efficiency
and automated systems would looked at to reduce
flight controller workload. By using the ISS
operations as a demonstration and validation ground
for the use of new technologies, MOD will be able to
assess where, when and how additional advanced
software systems will impact Constellation Program
mission operations, and how those will enable the goal
of an autonomy capable system for NASA’s
Exploration. The migration of autonomy-based
mission support tools from the ground to the spacecraft
will be a CxP Programmatic decision, but MOD is
attempting to assess and support operational use of this
technology both for ground operations improvements
and for future spacecraft infusion.
The NASA mission community tends to be properly
conservative about the use of new technology in
mission-critical, and life-critical, situations. The
automation necessary to support advanced operations
is correctly perceived as involving new technology.
Consequently, a realistic way to create acceptance of
this new technology is to perform a series of analog
operations using existing spacecraft, principally ISS,
and then to begin using the technology in CEV
missions as soon as practical.
In order to meet these new operational requirements it
is critical that advanced operations are assumed from
the beginning of the CEV development process.
Operations concepts have system-of-systems
implications for mission operations design, and tend to
become “baked” into mission design, operational
models, and culture.
CONSTELLATION PROGRAM ’ S CREWED NEO STUDY
The NASA Constellation Program study4
 in 2006-
20007 was to examine the flight elements of the
Constellation Program, such as the Orion manned
spacecraft as well as the Ares launch vehicles, for
suitability for deep space missions beyond the Moon,
and in particular, missions to NEOs. These missions
can test spacecraft systems, operational techniques,
crew experience, and acquire practical knowledge of
NEO physical characteristics (e.g., internal structure
and composition).
Previous studies were reviewed as a starting point for
establishing mission objectives and identifying
candidate target bodies and mission profiles. Mission
objectives would be updated in consultation with
Constellation Program mission designers and NEO
scientists. The existing database of NEOs was mined
to identify candidate targets. The study used special
software to identify candidate NEOs with short trip
times and low v’s in the appropriate time frame (late
2010s through the 2020s). Performance characteristics
of the Orion spacecraft and Ares launch vehicles were
analysed against the mission requirements for a
selected set of candidate targets.
Study Results Synopsis
At first order, the NEOs that are good targets of
opportunity for initi al piloted missions are those with
the following characteristics:
• Earth-like orbits (low eccentricity and low
inclination),
• close Earth approaches (i.e.,~0.05 AU of the
Earth Ð a potentially hazardous object or
PHO),
•	 slow rotation (i.e., rotation periods of ~10
hours or longer),
•	 single, solitary objects (nearly 1/6 h of all
NEOs are binary objects)
• asteroidal origin (i.e., not a cometary or extinct
comet, or transition object)
Some 35 candidate NEOs for exploration by piloted
CEV missions were found in the current NEO catalog.
Four launch options were assessed. These ranged from
using an Ares 1 /CEV with an EELV to launch a
Centaur-class upper stage for NEO orbit injection, to
the full Ares 1 and Ares V launch systems. Several
trajectories and mission lengths from 90 to 180 days
were examined.
CREWED NEO MISSION RATIONALE
Missions to NEOs reinforce the Constellation Program
with a broad suite of benefits. Deep space operational
experience (i.e., the manned CEV will be several light-
seconds from the Earth) is critical for building a
human presence in the inner solar system. The NEO
missions are a risk reduction for Constellation space
hardware for lunar missions as well as Mars missions.
This mission would provide great confidence building
for future mission scenarios (e.g., lunar poles and
farside, other NEOs, and eventually Mars).
Additionally the early in situ resource utilization
(ISRU) evaluation from a NEO would help to validate
or disprove the ideas for using asteroids as material
resources. Of course there is a rich scientific return for
understanding how the solar system formed. Sending
a human expedition to a NEO, within the context of
the exploration vision, will help NASA in many ways
as this is an exciting new mission class for the
Constellation Program, marking humanity’s first foray
beyond the Earth-Moon system.
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CEV Science Capabilities:
A CEV-type mission will have a much greater
capability for science and exploration of NEOs than
robotic spacecraft. The main advantage of having
piloted missions to a NEO is the flexibility of the crew
to perform tasks and to adapt to situations in real time.
Robotic spacecraft have only limited capability for
scientific exploration, and may not be able to adapt as
readily to certain conditions encountered at a particular
NEO. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s
(JAXA) Hayabusa spacecraft encountered certain
situations that were a challenge for both it and its
ground controllers during close proximity operations at
asteroid Itokawa. A human crew is ab le to perform
tasks and react quickly in a microgravity environment,
faster than any robotic spacecraft could (rapid yet
delicate manoeuvring has been a hallmark of Apollo,
Skylab, and Shuttle operations). In addition, a crewed
vehicle is able to test seve ral different sample
collection techniques, and to target specific areas of
interest via extra -vehicular activities (EVAs) much
more capably than a robotic spacecraft. Such
capabilities greatly enhance any scientific return from
these types of missions to NEOs.
In terms of remote sensing capability, the CEV should
have a high-resolution camera for detailed surface
characterization and optical navigation. A light
detection and ranging (LIDAR) system would be
essential for hazard avoidance (during close proximity
operations) and detailed topography measurements. In
addition, the CEV should be outfitted with a radar
transmitter to perform tomography, enabling a detailed
look at the interior structure of the NEO. Given that
several NEOs appear to have a high degree of porosity
(e.g., Itokawa is estimated to be 40% void space by
volume), it is important to measure this characteristic
of the target NEO. Such information on its internal
structure not only has implications for the formation
and impact history of the NEO, but also may have
implications for future hazard mitigation techniques.
Another advantage of the CEV is the capability to
precisely place and re-deploy relatively small scientific
packages on the surface of the NEO. Such packages as
remotely operated (or autonomous) rovers with one or
two instruments could greatly enhance the amount of
data obtained from the surface, and fine -tune the site
selection for subsequent sample collection. Other
packages that may be deployed could be in situ
experiments designed to test such technologies as
surface anchors/tethers, drills/excavation equipment,
or material extraction equipment. The CEV could also
deploy a transponder to the surface of the object for a
long-term study of the NEO’s orbital motion. This
could be particularly useful for monitoring objects that
have the potential for a possible future Earth impact.
The crew has the added advantage of EVA for sample
collection during close proximity operations. The
ability for the crew to traverse and collect one or more
macroscopic samples from specific terrains on the
surface of an NEO is the most important scientific
aspect of this type of mission. Having a human being
interacting in real-time with the NEO surface material
and sampling various locales in context would bring a
wealth of scientific information on such things as
particle size, potential space weathering effects, impact
history, material properties, and near-surface densities
of the NEO.
CREWED NEO MISSION HUMAN/AUTOMATION
TRADE-TREES
As we look beyond the space station program and past
the moon towards the exploration of the inner solar
system, near-Earth asteroids offer a feasible, attractive
stepping stones to Mars and beyond. Piloted human
missions to NEOs prior to human exploration of Mars
can provide unique opportunities to validate mission
technologies and acquire deep space operational
experience unobtainable elsewhere.
< This portion of the material is in development and
incomplete for this paper draft. The intent is to pick
several normal engineering and scientific decision
processes and determine the criteria for assessing
whether they are better done earth-based or on-board,
and what are they break points that would require
them to remain earth-based, or force them to be on-
board. Communication delays, and speed of response
are several issues that will drive this assessment. >
CONCLUSIONS <DRAFT>
As crewed missions go beyond low-earth orbit and
begin to enter interplanetary space, the time-delay for
communication with earth will constrain the existing
mission operations paradigm from a solely earth-based
system to more and more on-board automation and
crew autonomy. For a first step into this realm, the
operational benefits alone of a human venture into
deep space make a mission to a NEO a valuable
prospect as a precursor to future Mars missions.
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